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ABSTRACT 
 
Peter L. Berger’s Early Conception of Agency: Exposition and Evaluation 
 
by  
 
James Greene 
 
Peter L. Berger’s conception of agency in his earliest writings (c.1954 – 1960) is logically and 
empirically inadequate. At the root of this inadequacy is an idealism that prevents him from 
providing a compelling account of actual empirical agency. Chapter 1 asserts that Berger’s 
earlier works warrant analysis. Chapter 2 discusses Berger’s earliest influences, particularly Max 
Weber and The Swedish Lund School of motif research. Chapter 3 identifies a unique 
commitment to Christian Humanism at the base of Berger’s conception of agency. Chapter 4 
clarifies how Berger’s Christian humanism interacts with his Weberian, and Parsonian-inspired 
functional analysis of the American religious establishment. The thesis concludes (Chapter 5) by 
identifying more specifically how and why Berger’s Christian humanism undermines his attempt 
to empirically ground human agency. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Problem 
 
The precise nature of the agency-structure relationship remains a contentious issue in 
contemporary sociological thought.1 The problem of agency may be formulated as: How shall we 
understand the possibility of individual human autonomy and its relation to a complex modern 
industrial society? This thesis focuses on how the eminent sociologist and theologian Peter L. 
Berger tries to answer that question. Specifically, this thesis claims Berger’s earliest formulation 
of conceptions of agency-structure relations evident in his major published writings c. 1954-1961 
is theoretically flawed. Berger’s religious and spiritual a priori assumptions prevent his 
theoretical system from grounding an empirically discernable agency. The following chapters 
identify how Berger’s sociological and theological commitments regarding this spiritual 
immediacy leads him to necessarily focus on only those features of human society that are 
radically contingent. Ironically, in the end Berger’s idealism leads to an abstractly conceived 
social structure whose convictions of production also escape the agent’s own powers and 
capacities. 
Literature Review 
Peter L. Berger’s contributions to debates over “secularization” (See e.g. Harvey 1973: 
Hadden 1987; Tschannen 1991; Yamane 1997; Stark 1999; Swatos Jr. et. al. 1999; Weigel and 
Berger 1999; Stark and Finke 2000; Norris and Ingelhart 2004; Beckford and Demerath 2007; 
Chistiano et. al. 2008), religious pluralization (See e.g. Stark et. al. 1995; Weigel and Berger 
1999; Berger 2001: Chaves and Gorski. 2001; Voas et. al. 2002), and religious fundamentalism 
                                                
1 For a detailed explication of the definition of “agency” see e.g. Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische. 1998. “What 
Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology, 103 (4): 962-1023.  
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(Wiegel and Berger 1999; Berger 2010) are relatively well-known. Scholars generally focus on 
his later writing, and have not to date investigate his earliest conception of agency.2 A few 
authors have contributed to this debate, however. 
Gary Dorrien (2001) specifically addresses Berger’s theological influences and political 
interests, focusing on the early 1960s in which Berger’s ethical and moral focus is American 
Christianity and is related to a “semi-Kierkegaardian attack on the triumph of the therapeutic in 
the churches” (28). Dorrien further critiques Berger’s theology as neo-conservatively motivated. 
Bernice Martin (2001) disagrees with Dorrien, however, and regards Berger’s critique as both 
accurate and ‘prophetic.’  
Nicholas Abercrombie (1986) specifically describes Berger’s intellectual exploration of 
agency and autonomy as refreshingly distinct from those various sociologists who have tried to 
“rescue the hidden individual dimension but have failed to do so ending in at the level of 
structural” (11). Abercrombie further notes that Talcott Parsons’s functionalist system dominated 
the sociological discipline, and though the intellectual climate of the 1960s thirsted for a more 
robust concept of agency, “this debate like others was pitched at the level of social structure and 
tended to ignore the level of individual agency” (ibid., 11). Berger’s own synthesis “generat[ed] 
interest in a whole range of newer perspectives from phenomenology to Weber’s theory of 
action” (ibid., 11-12). Abercrombie’s analysis however addresses a later Bergerian social 
constructionism in the period 1963 to 1970s, one in which Berger’s notion of agency is informed 
by the Schützian concepts of the life-world. During this period, Berger uses the life-world 
concept as a conceptual “workshop for human meaning” (Ahern 1999: 62-71).  Van A. Harvey 
                                                
 
2 For commentaries focused on Berger’s general theoretical career see e.g. Ahern 1999; Ainlay1986; Hunter, and 
Woodhead et. al.  2002;  Fernandez 2003;  Wuthnow et. al. 1984. 
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(1973) concludes regarding his analysis of Berger’s most well known book The Sacred Canopy 
(1967) that Berger presents “human nature [as] almost entirely a cultural product…[and][o]n this 
assumption, it is difficult to speak of human nature at all” (90).  
 
Methodology 
 
The research design for this study consists of a conceptual-theoretical analysis of Peter L. 
Berger’s earliest conception of agency c.1954 to 1961. The following primary writings are 
analyzed: From Sect to Church: A Sociological Interpretation of the Baha’i Movement. (1954a), 
“The Sociological Study of Sectarianism.” ([1954] 1984), “Sectarianism and Religious 
Sociation.” (1958), “Camus, Bonhöffer, and the World Come of Age.” (1959), “The Problem of 
Christian Community in Modern Society” (1960), The Precarious Vision: A Sociologist Looks at 
Social Fictions and Christian Faith (1961a), and The Noise of Solemn Assemblies: Christian 
Commitment and the Religious Establishment in America (1961b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
CONCEIVING AGENCY IN SECT AND CHURCH: MAX WEBER AND RELIGIOUS 
MOTIF RESEARCH 
 
Peter L. Berger’s (1954a; [1954b] 1984; 1958) theory of agency begins with a fairly 
orthodox reliance on Max Weber and a Swedish school of religious studies. His dissertation 
modifies and expands on Weber’s church and sect typologies, particularly his analysis of the 
reciprocal relation between ‘church’ and ‘sect’ and the undercurrent and/or driving energy-force 
associated with ‘charisma.’ Berger also further develops a methodology pioneered by the 
Swedish School of motif research to better understand relations of sect and church.3 Unlike later 
writings, in these earliest formulations Berger remains cautiously sociological and his idealistic 
premise is significantly subdued.  
Amending Max Weber’s Concepts 
From Weber’s own point of view, it is necessary to get to the inner meanings 
behind these phenomena. And since these inner meanings are religious, a 
definition is needed that will take the specific religious differentiation into 
account 4 
 
Church-Sect Typology 
According to Berger, most of the post-Weberian studies relating to sects and churches 
were limited to Germanic and European regions of the world and many Weberian-inspired 
                                                
3 See e.g. Gustav Aulén. [1923] (1973). The Faith of the Christian Church. Trans. E. H. Wahlstrom, Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press. Anders Nygrén. [1932] (1982). Agape & Eros. Trans. P. S. Watson. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.   
 
4 Berger [1954b] 1984: 370-371. 
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scholars erroneously conceive sect and church as radically divergent.5 In contrast, Berger offers 
his own rendering of Weber’s concepts. Citing Weber, he asserts that church and sect are 
‘political institutions that exercise authority and force upon the laity’ ([1954b] 1984: 368).6 A 
sect is a type of organization (Verband) characterized by the fact that it is voluntarily joined by 
individuals and therefore coercion and force are rarely exercised. A church, as a type of 
institutionalized ruling organization (Herrschaftsverband), however, is “a political institution 
with a normative order…which maintain[s] its order by psychological force over a continuing 
period of time…granting and withholding sacramental goods” (ibid., 368).7  
Berger claims that the Weberian usage of sect is less than adequate, possibly 
misinterpreted, and illogical.8 Some scholars consider sect literally as a protest, the root word of 
Protestantism, and a type of segregated rebellious group that secedes from the church such as the 
Puritans, Lutherans, Baptists, and many early Christian movements. Berger disagrees however. 
First, this conception of sect is an inaccurate description in the American case—not to mention 
countermovements and other occurrences even within the Catholic church. For example, in 
America it would be erroneous to name “present-day Baptists as a sect” as they have become one 
of the largest political organizations in America ([1954b] 1984: 370). Second, Christian 
                                                
5 Berger goes into detail identifying the various flaws he alleges exist in Weberian scholarship on the concepts 
church and sect.  See, e.g. Berger [1954b] 1984. “The Sociological Study of Sectarianism.” Social Research, 51(1-
2): 367-385. 
 
6 Berger is referencing the incomplete fragments in Max Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Economy and 
Society] (Tubingen 1947, vol. 1, p. 29). 
 
7 It is important to note Berger relies on earlier pre-critical German texts of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft rather than 
the modern English renderings. Nevertheless, it is Berger’s Weber that is key and therefore binding.  
 
8 He states: “Although it is true that churches, by and large, possess a hierocratical [sic] order and exercise 
hierocratical [sic] force on all within their power, while sects possess no such order and recruit themselves from 
those who freely respond to a certain religious experience, we must pry deeper into the nature of both these 
phenomena in order to grasp them fully. From Weber’s own point of view, it is necessary to get to the inner 
meanings behind these phenomena. And since these inner meanings are religious, a definition is needed that will 
take the specific religious differentiation into account” ([1954b] 1984: 370-371).    
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communities and denominations also fall into the category of sect; yet these groups formulated 
large, bureaucratic church structures rather quickly.  
The ‘acute diffusion’ of the Baha’i movement within the Western modern world presents 
Berger with empirical clues as to the reconfiguration of church and sect typologies in America. 
Based on his analysis of this movement, Berger (1954a) concludes that sectarian movements 
have the ability to be much more mobile and less constricted than churches. The unique 
characteristics displayed in the Baha’i groups show transference from Islamic to Christian 
contexts due their social locality within America and therefore ‘Western consciousness’ (179). 
The Ecology of the Sacred and Charisma 
The Baha’i movement also provides Berger an opportunity to observe the ‘inner 
meanings’ of religious groups in regards to space, which Berger calls an “ecology of the sacred” 
(Berger [1954]1984: 375). Figure 1 below illustrates immediate versus mediated agency in 
Berger’s early religious theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Berger 1954a;[ 1954b] 1984; as modified) 
Figure 1 Peter Berger’s Ecology of the Sacred: Immediate v Mediated Spirituality 
 
The sectarian experience for Berger is, in contrast to Weber, not based on voluntarism or 
compulsion in membership but rather the experienced immediacy or mediation of spirit 
conceived as God’s gifted powers. Sectarian groupings formulate within the church, as well as 
without. These sectarian groups experience an immediacy of spirit rather than the church as a 
Groups immediate with 
sprit formulate the sect  
More agency as there 
is immediacy within 
the structure 
                World 
   Church 
   Sect 
   Spirit 
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structure “mediating between spirit and the world” (ibid., 376).9 Closer proximity to immediate 
spirit—for highly committed church members and others in smaller bodies of voluntary 
adherents—renders religious behavior as deeply spiritual/meaningful within the structure, thus 
moving further from a spiritless world mediation. It is the criterion of proximity then that leads 
Berger to define sect “as a religious grouping based on the belief that the spirit is immediately 
present. And the church, on the other hand, may be defined as a religious grouping based on the 
belief that the spirit is remote” (ibid., 374).  
Sect is distinguishable from church “for it comes from the inner logic of social-religious 
groupings themselves” (Berger [1954] 1984: 368) and is also is an “island formation” that is 
distinguished from society as “essentially subjective, unique, and transcendent” (ibid., 374). 
Social agents themselves sustain maneuverability and assert their subjectivity within the very 
group in which they are derived—the church. A church can be conceptually separated as an 
“individualistic, free-flowing spirituality” (Berger 1954a:149) or not, depending on the church 
grouping and its relation to the world; sect can either be “transitory” or “lasting” depending on 
(for both church and sect) the experienced immediacy of spirit. The positively institutionalized 
structures within churches are most likely the cause for the remoteness of spirit and its mediation 
with world (ibid., 152), and indeed, the “mediating between the spirit and the world” (Berger 
[1954] 1984: 376).  
Sectarian agency concerns the “religious object as such” (i.e. salvific-oriented belief and 
action) and is “subject in action” (i.e. God’s objectification as spiritual grace) but must occur 
                                                
9 He states: “By spirit is meant the religious object as such, that object which will always, of course, appear to faith 
as a subject [i.e. God, Christ] in action. The spirit may be said, then, to create the religious experience in which man 
encounters that which is sacred…The spirit manifests itself to man in a way that can generally be determined 
geographically, as it were—in a human being or animal, in certain objects, in a specific holy place sometimes 
natural and sometimes artificially created” (Berger [1954b] 1984: 374-375).  
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within space, time, and around a spiritual locality (Berger 1954a: 152-153). Most sect/church 
typologies, Berger asserts, lack concepts that permit a dynamic analysis of those processes by 
which sects transform over time. (Berger [1954b] 1984) explains:  
…it becomes clear that [these relationships between church, sect, spirit, and 
world] are anything but static in character. In terms of graphic representation, the 
center may shift at any moment. The spirit blows where it wills, and at anytime 
may manifest itself anew in the middle of what used to be the world, thus creating 
a new system of relations. And, significantly, the spirit may also manifest itself 
anew within the old and set structure of a church, setting in motion right there the 
explosive dynamic of sectarianism (ibid., 376).   
 
Thus we are led to a discussion of the Weberian concept known as ‘charisma.’  
Charisma is a force that imbues religious leaders, various groups, or a larger legal setting. 
Distinct to the church, sectarian charisma “is attached to the religious leader” (Berger [1954] 
1984: 369). He argues that charisma and agency are in a dynamic interplay. “Charisma 
represents the sudden eruption into history of quite new forces, often linked to quite new ideas” 
(Berger 1963: 949).10 In order to accomplish such an analysis of spirit, Berger employs the 
methodology of the Swedish School of motif research.  
The Swedish School, Religious Motifs and Historically Tracing Agency 
The Swedish School and Religious Motif Research  
Berger further deepens his conception of agency by appropriating and modifying a 
particular body of thought originating in Sweden known as ‘motif research.’11 A religious motif 
                                                
10 See also how charisma and its ‘routinization’ can be detected in Israelite prophecy thus amending another portion 
of Weberian sociology (e.g.  Peter L. Berger 1963a. “Charisma and Religious Innovation: The Social Location of 
Israelite Prophecy.” American Sociological Review, 28(6): 940-950.) 
 
11 He states: “We are indebted for our concept of the religious motif to the so-called Lund school of Swedish 
theology, especially the work of Anders Nygrén and Gustav Aulén. The Swedish theologians have been interested in 
tracing certain dominant motifs throughout Christian history. In this approach they have concerned themselves with 
the contents of Christian faith rather than with theological contents proper, in accordance with their view that 
theology was not a normative science, but an objective scientific analysis of the contents of faith” (1954a: 159). See 
e.g. Aulén, Gustav. [1923] (1973). The Faith of the Christian Church. Trans. E. H. Wahlstrom, Philadelphia: 
17 
 
is defined as a “specific pattern (gestalt if you wish) of religious experience that can be traced in 
[its] historical development” (Berger: 1954a: 159). An adaptation of Berger’s ([1954b] 1984) 
motif typology for his analysis of the Baha’i movement is displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Peter L. Berger’s Sectarian Motifs 
 
 
Type                   Motif  Attitude Toward 
World 
 
                                                      Enthusiastic: An Experience To Be Lived 
  
Revivalist 
Pentecostal 
“Fire falling from  
Heaven” 
 World  saving 
  
Pietist 
Holiness 
 
“Follow the gleam” 
  
World avoiding 
                                                       Prophetic: A Message To Be Proclaimed  
 
Chiliastic 
 
“The Lord is coming” 
 
 
 
 
World warning 
 
Legalistic 
 
“A new order”  World conquering 
                                                        Gnostic: A Secret To Be Divulged 
 
Oriental 
 
“Wisdom from the 
East” 
  World irrelevant 
New Thought 
 
“Powers in the soul”   World irrelevant 
Spiritist 
 
“Voices from beyond”   World irrelevant 
 
 (Berger [1954b] 1984: 379; as modified) 
 
Religious groupings exhibit three general motifs that undergo a reciprocally determined 
development. These motifs are flexible: they can proceed or succeed one another; a religious 
                                                                                                                                                       
Fortress Press. Nygrén, Anders. [1932] (1982). Agape & Eros. Trans. P. S. Watson. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
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grouping can simultaneously contain elements of each; each represents a phase of ‘routinization,’ 
where routinization is, for Weber the historical, rational ordering process into traditional or legal 
institutions over time (1954a: 149, 170). For example, in his analysis of the Baha’i movement 
two fundamental motifs are manifest: prophetic and gnostic (Berger 1954a: 164). The prophetic 
motif begins as chiliastic, a fullness of agency, spiritual immediacy, and centered on a 
charismatic leader. The legalistic motif involves a disappearance of a religiously charismatic 
leadership. Eventually, the motif assumes an ecclesiastical or organized church form. The 
gnostic motif also routinizes over time as “monism may develop into complete mysticism and 
pantheism, or it may become secularized in a naturalistic conception. The latter is what happened 
in the Baha’i case” (Berger: 1954a: 165). The chiliastic motif can initially be prophetic, but due 
to routinization it can develop into a legalistic motif and later an ecclesia.  
The relationship between the sect and the world is a complex one. We can say, 
however, that a change in pressure takes place as the process of “routinization” 
goes on…the pressures would seem strongest in the direction from the religious to 
the social, that is, the religious motif largely determines the inner social structure 
of the sect, as we have described. Later, however, as the spirit recedes into 
remoteness and the sect hardens, as it were into ecclesiastical forms, the pressures 
predominate in the other direction, from the social to the religious, as the church 
makes its peace with the world and is invaded with the latter’s social realities, 
norms, institutions (ibid., 157).  
 
In sum, for Berger, a “fundamental motif” remains within and undergirds the patterning of 
religious groups, including every church structure that, on the surface, appears overly formalized 
and fixed. The motif both modulates and reconfigures the structure in question. Figure 2 portray  
the changes in motif pressures over time. 
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                          Charismatic Routinization Overtime  
Figure 2 Changes in Motif Pressures 
 
Berger’s description of sectarian dynamics due to motif pressures is followed by his assessment 
of what is called a “meaning system.”  
Conversion, Alternation, and Meaning Systems 
It is one system among many and only within it exists the illusion of universal 
communication. The meaning systems that spring up anew all around us bear the 
character of sectarian religion. It is thus no accident that sectarianism proper has 
found a fertile field.12 
 
The fundamental motifs project outwardly and combine to structure a ‘meaning system.’ 
An individual’s meaning system can either constrain or enable agency. Traditional meaning 
systems can be taken advantage of by a religious authority to restrict agency. Or an individual 
may co-exist among many cultures and therefore navigate “contradictory meaning systems” 
arising in the “religious market” that sets up pluralistic situations in which sectarian groups 
thrive. The phenomenon of conversion in certain situations creates a possibility that 
                                                
12 Berger 1954a: 183. 
 
Spirit 
 
 
 
 
Immediacy 
(Sect) 
Chiliastic Legalistic    Ecclesiastic 
Ecclesiastical 
Form (Church) 
 
 
Fundamental Prophetic Motif 
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“communication becomes impossible” due to not having a “common frame of reference” (Berger 
1954a: 182). “Our age is an age of conversion,” Berger claims, and “[c]onversion has taken the 
place of communication, the ‘leap’ replaces reason and argument” (ibid., 182).  
Alternation, rather than a ‘leap of faith’ (i.e. conversion), a ‘passing from one to another 
meaning system’ for Berger replaces reason and argumentation. Alternation, in contrast, is not a 
leap but rather a negotiating of meaning systems. Conversion occurs when a totalizing meaning 
system is ecologically present; alternation occurs when greater freedom and movement exists in 
and between meaning systems. According to Berger, “[a] seedbed of sectarianism” exists when 
competing meaning systems, due to the plural market situation of the modern world, facilitates 
conversions. Berger’s observation of the Baha’i movement leads him to conclude that while it is 
possible to understand alternation theoretically, as seen in his motif research, switching or 
alternating back and forth from one meaning system to another is ‘psychologically improbable’ 
to ascertain empirically (ibid., 182-183). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, CHRISTIAN HUMANISM, AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL 
FICTIONS: THE SOCIAL WORLD AS ALIBI 
Berger’s idealistic conception of agency and agency-structure relations first finds 
expression in his first major book, The Precarious Vision (1961a). Two core bases for a 
conception of human agency are offered: one that uses various social psychological insights to 
‘debunk’ societal fictions, but far more tellingly, a second grounded in a type of Christian 
humanism that demands radical moral freedom as the individual faces up to his or her own 
individual existence.13 In terms of the latter, the question becomes: How is a genuine Christian 
authenticity possible in the modern world?  
The Social Psychological Structure of Fictions 
The Problem with Alternation and Meaning Systems 
Berger (1961a) discovers a curious problem when he met adherents of the Baha’i faith for 
interviews.14 Adherents became fascinated by the vast amount of knowledge that he had acquired 
of their faith and were under the impression that Berger himself was a believer. After Berger 
informed members of the movement that he was in fact not a believer the adherents became 
                                                
13 From 1959 to 1961, Berger authors several essays, on Christianity that address elements of the notion of freedom 
and liberation from an ‘inauthentic’ society. This chapter addresses two essays:  a two-part piece published April 8th 
and 15th,1959 for The Christian Century titled, “Camus, Bonhöffer, and the World Come of Age.”  
 
14 Berger (1961a: 124): “The adherents of a sect, upon finding out that the writer had some knowledge of its history 
and tenets, immediately assumed that he was a believer. When he identified himself as a nonbeliever, it was as if the 
previous information about his knowledge of sectarian lore had been wiped out from their memory. They now began 
to tell him the simplest, most commonly known facts about the sect in question. While this mechanism cannot be 
called apologetics, it is carried by the same defensive reaction” (Berger: 1961a: 124). Berger also tells this story in a 
recent autobiographical account of his writing and accomplishments in his  Adventures with Sociology – An “Ego-
history” (2009).   
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awkwardly surprised and quickly began to challenge Berger’s expertise. From this he realized 
that techniques of ‘alternation prevention’ are actually quite elaborate. They consist of practical 
techniques, rituals, confessions, theological elaboration and so forth, which are formulated to 
deal with doubt, fear, and uncertainty. These systemizations have become vastly more 
complicated over time through organized procedures (ibid., 125). 
Berger asserts that individuals and groups will go to great lengths to prevent exit from a 
meaning system. “Whatever happens, the believer must be prevented from what we have called 
‘alternating’ that is, prevented from an ecstasy or conversion which will transport him outside 
the system, even for a moment of intellectual inspection” (Berger 1961a: 125). Conversion, for 
example, provides new possibilities of agency because one alternates and switches one’s world 
view (Weltanschauung). Though this gestalt offers a clue to discovering agency, in fact generally 
an individual remains permanently submerged in a meaning system. How does what is in fact 
unreal—a subjective meaning system—become overwhelmingly real? In what follows Berger’s 
explication of this unique process is described.  
The World-Taken-For-Granted 
Berger’s (1961a) social psychological analysis of the fictive nature of social reality 
begins with an analysis of a Schützian notion of ‘the world taken-for-granted,’ i.e. individuals do 
not recognize their productive role in creating, they just presume a world already made. “For 
most of us, as we grow up and learn to live in society, its forms take on the appearance of 
structures as self-evident and as solid as those of the natural cosmos” (ibid., 10). This form of the 
taken-for-granted consciousness creates familiarity, one that does not require thought or 
reflection.  
Yet this consciousness of what Alfred Schuetz [sic] has called the “world taken 
for granted” is not of such solidity that it cannot be breached. When such a breach 
23 
 
occurs the world is transformed, takes on new dimensions and colors. If the 
breach occurs suddenly it marks the day after which life will never be the same 
again (ibid., 10-11).  
 
A breach occurs when consciousness reflects on reality.  If this reflection turns to self-reflection 
or introspection, the agent’s ‘vision’ of the world then has the potential to undermine fictitious 
constraints. Despite the apparent reality of fictions, they still have real social consequence.  
Dramatic Play and Precariousness 
Berger conceives individuals as actors enacting a fictional play rooted in taken-for-
granted consciousness thereby not realizing its fictitiousness.15 When the taken-for-granted 
world consciousness is breached, precariousness arises in feelings of uncertainty. This breach in 
the taken-for-granted world then forces an actor to realize his or her position in the play. Given 
genuine reflection, the actor now sees the play as a masquerade.16 The breach occurs when 
someone interrupts the game and calls into question the entirety of its fictitiousness. At that point 
actors step outside of the ‘play form’ by no longer adhering to the ‘script.’ For example, consider 
a Christian armed for a theological discussion on the “continuum of the sanctified, the saved, the 
lukewarm, and the scoffers” (Berger 1961a: 70). Imagine then that the Christian is then informed 
that the person to be saved is a Buddhist, Hindu, or Muslim. The taken-for-granted at that 
                                                
15  Berger (1961a) explains that individuals interacting in the ‘play form’ literally resemble that of playing a game. 
They go through their roles, their everyday life, routines, and procedures without reflection (Berger 1961a: 71 also 
see e.g. Simmel [1908] 1950: 48). Erving Goffman’s notion of ‘the stage’ further allows Berger to expand this 
notion of the ‘taken-for-granted’ social reality. Berger (1961a) especially traces his notion of dramatic play as 
society to J. Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (see e.g. Berger 1961a: 233). Berger (2009) also discusses the long lasting 
influence of his teacher Albert Solomon who rather enjoyed teaching sociological courses based on reading French 
novels of Honoré de Balzac.  
 
16 Berger (1961a): “We may conclude with a picture. If we combine the notion of determination with that of drama 
we arrive at a provocative vision—that of a puppet theater. And thus we perceive men running about to and fro on 
the stage, going through the motions of the play—all the time with keys turning slowly and predictably in their 
backs. But there is one decisive difference between the puppets of society, but with a strange, almost sinister 
capacity. For we can stop in our tracks, turn around and look over our shoulders—and perceive the keys turning in 
our backs. This act of consciousness is the first step into freedom. That this act is a possibility is the decisive 
justification of the social-scientific enterprise” (66).   
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moment is breached and causes reflection. While this particular breach did not radically disrupt 
the social game, other extreme cases can call into question the entirety of society itself.  
In another example Berger (1961a) forces the breach to an extreme through his vivid 
description of how WWII European aerial bombings radically disrupted human routines.17 For 
example, walking or jogging down a street which is ordinarily an everyday routine. Yet suddenly 
one’s awareness of a street, house, traffic sign, sidewalk, or cars swerving on the road is now 
radically ruptured. This ‘breach’ in everyday consciousness arises from the display of exploding 
buildings, scattered rubble, people screaming, crying, yelling, and the breakout of mass hysteria. 
The agent is ripped from a mode of thought presuming a mere façade of the ‘taken-for-granted’ 
reality. Once presumed, it is now called into question. Insecure feelings at best, and shock, 
horror, or trauma at worst now flood an agent’s consciousness. Before such a breach, the street 
was not an object of reflection but was assumed as the purely ‘taken-for-granted.’ 
The Functioning Fiction 
Berger (1961a) proposes that the sociological consciousness is intrinsically based in 
reflective premises that empower individuals with the freedom to call into question society’s 
apparent ‘giveness.’ “What characterizes this perspective more than anything else is the manner 
in which it transforms a world which we are taught to take for granted into one that is very 
questionable indeed” (ibid., 9). The sociological consciousness conclusively shows that society is 
a stage that is far from sturdy. First, Berger is clear in stating that ‘society’ is not a fiction. 
Society, Berger states, may be “viewed as a whole, a system of assumptions, conventions, and 
procedures shared by a group of human beings” (ibid., 104). It is also the case, as sociological 
                                                
17 Peter Berger was born in Vienna March 17, 1929, grew up during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and 
emigrated to New York City in 1946. One can only imagine the horrors he experienced first-hand.  
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functionalism presumes, “most of the time, [persons] will act in such a way that the play can go 
on” (ibid., 104).18 In the main, people do follow their roles and participate in day-to-day 
activities that do not disrupt the stage nor instigate its collapse. However, a deeper social 
psychological view reveals what in general sociological functionalism conceals: the stability of 
society is actually rooted in the subjective and collective adherence to learned and internalized 
roles.  
George Herbert Mead, for example, explains that societal roles are internalized within 
consciousness in the earliest moments of socialization: “In the process of socialization the value 
structure of society becomes the inner value structure of the individual conscience…society no 
longer just confronts the child as external reality but has become part and parcel of his inner self” 
(Berger: 1961a: 105). Every society universally requires this process for its continuation as the 
“purpose of social control is to keep society going despite the occasional foibles and iniquities of 
its membership” (ibid., 105). The internalization of roles can sometimes be regarded as an 
“invisible cop sitting squarely in the middle of their heads” (ibid., 105).19 Society thus comprises 
actors in the taken-for-granted mode, attached to roles ‘constructing projects toward the future’ 
and perpetuating their own submersion in these roles (ibid., 52). ‘Society’ as a complete object is 
finally erected as the ultimate collection and webs of meaning systems arising in and attached to 
roles. The individual appears therefore totally assimilated to and submerged in social structure 
devoid of agency.  
                                                
18 See especially (1961a Chapter 3, and Chapter 6) for Berger’s examination of and borrowings from several 
important thinkers such as Ralph Linton, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, William James, Robert Merton, Max 
Weber, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud and Talcott Parsons. 
 
19 This argument represents a synthesis of Mead’s notions with those of Edward Alsworth Ross, Sigmund Freud, and 
Talcott Parsons. 
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Religion, a uniquely powerful subset of this institutional combine, for Berger, is the 
epitome of such control. Berger offers witty examples, funny scenarios, stories, historical 
anecdotes, and a wide-ranging discussion of how unreflective agents reproduce social fictions 
without awareness of their own genuine powers, and as facets of a fictional conjuring such 
phenomena as capital punishment, law, marriage, power, politics, religion, norms, routines, and 
rituals. Such apparently objective facts as ‘society,’ ‘roles,’ and ‘functions’ in fact, while 
exhibiting costumes and masks, conceal the “magnificent fakery on the rest of the cast” (Berger 
1961a: 80).20 These rules, norms, or scripts are followed without knowing why they should be 
followed in the first place.  
Berger concludes by noting that an emancipatory insight can be derived as a consequence 
of this sociological ‘debunking’, i.e., “we…contend that this attitude is not a one-sidedly 
oppressive one. It also has a liberating side” (ibid., 84). This awareness is liberating because this 
knowledge arises from our self-reflection: it depends on us as thinking beings. Realizing that 
“the oracles are ghostwritten by nervous little men who copy from each other” may be 
disconcerting, yet may be the most rewarding since we after all are the authors of “our own 
knowledge” (ibid., 84).  
The Realization of Social World as Alibi: Stepping Outside of Society and into Individual Human 
Existence 
Berger’s social psychological description of society as fiction unearths a type of human 
authenticity that is compatible with that discovered by philosophical existentialism. Berger’s 
social psychological conception of bad faith is defined as follows: “Bad faith means that society 
                                                
20 He states: “As soon as we get beyond the strictly technological aspects of society, there are few of its aspects that 
cannot be sharply illuminated in this comic perspective of fictitiousness. Whether one looks at the world of learning, 
or the world of power, or the world of religion—everywhere one will find actors carefully masked and costumed to 
put over some magnificent fakery on the rest of the cast” (Berger 1961a: 80). 
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assists us in hiding our own actions from our awareness. The role becomes a moral alibi” (1961a: 
89) and the actor “excuses himself by pointing to his social role and to the ideologies in which 
the role is enveloped” (ibid., 89).21 With bad faith an actor in the taken-for-granted play uses 
‘society as an alibi’ and does not question whether social reality is fictional or detrimental to 
human existence.  Bad faith is endemic to all cultures within which individuals posit blame on a 
societal role or society generally rather than free moral choice.  
Berger’s description of capital punishment via the electric chair provides his most vivid 
accounts of the operation and moral consequences of bad faith. Societal roles are wielded so that 
no one will have to assume responsibility for the actual murder of a fellow human being. “No 
matter what method of deceit is finally used in the execution itself, it is a lie that nobody is doing 
any killing…This is the reality. The rest is fiction, mythology, alibi” (ibid., 88). He provides 
another example of a Russian spy captured by the German army who studies the German war 
manual to learn of the proper way to die as a prisoner, more so he could enact the role of ‘dying 
by the book.’ The officer who shoots him could then remark that he ‘died well’, ‘brave’, and so 
forth. On the other hand, one may observe the taken-for-granted bad faith whereby the officer 
gains respect for his victim and justifies his role as executioner. The victim also immediately 
attaches to a societal role; in this case the standard and ‘proper’ manner of death for a war 
prisoner. Both executioner and prisoner attach themselves to a societal alibi: “[B]ad faith is not 
an alibi from guilt but rather an alibi from terror. Both torturer and victim are in bad faith” (ibid., 
91).  
The most “terrifying aspects of existence” are also “avoided” through bad faith (Berger 
1961a: 95). Following Heidegger, Berger deploys the notion of “das Man” to refer to a social 
                                                
21 Berger modifies Sartre’s term “bad faith” to denote an actor submerged in a taken-for-granted societal role 
maintained as moral alibi.  
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generality “Man” or “mankind as such,” thus evacuating and extinguishing the particulars of 
each individual’s existence. The finality and terror of death is thus avoided: not an individual 
terror to be faced in a unique way, but as an abstraction applicable to “humanity as such.” For an 
example of generalized versus individualized finality of death, Berger points to a funeral he 
attended following World War II  involving a tragic death of a Jewish child in which the rabbi 
stated ‘this is not the time for another Jew to die.’ This implies that we all die as something, in a 
role that “becomes a fiction which vicariously dies for them” (ibid., 97). 
Only men die. Their anguish, their terror, and their courage cannot be captured in 
the social categories. Perhaps the deepest obscenity of society lies in the fact that 
it continues to try. Unlike their mammalian relatives, few men are permitted to die 
“off stage.” To the last moment the social comedy continues all around them, and, 
what is more, they are expected to participate in it (ibid., 97). 
 
Humans hide from their particular existence, by pretended occupancy of a universal role or 
category. In radical contrast, Berger writes that an individual will experience authentication only 
when embracing the ecstasy (ekstasis) of “really confronting existence.” This is precisely that 
precarious liberating sociological consciousness that allows one to ‘step outside of oneself.’22 
Generalities (e.g. ‘das Man,’ ‘societal role’) require that a person die as something. In this way, 
consciousness is structured to prevent genuine reflection on one’s agency. However, non-
reflection is a fictitious, yet real, constraint.  
Society provides from birth to death one’s roles, categories, placement, names, and 
identifications. Playing entirely within the freedom provided by these roles makes for a “flight 
                                                
22 “However, it is not only this one terror which can be avoided in this way. The same is true of any experience of 
ecstasy, using that term in its original meaning of ekstasis—standing outside oneself. There are various situations in 
life in which it may suddenly seem to us that we have stepped outside the everyday course of events, that we are 
really confronting existence. This can be an experience of terror, though it need not always be. This writer has not 
fully understood why Heidegger gives such a privileged status to the one ecstasy of confronting my own death. 
There are other ecstasies of horror, awe, guilt, but also of sudden insight, pleasure, joy. What all ecstasies have in 
common is breaking through the routine, everyday, taken-for-granted course of our life. Society functions to prevent 
this break-through. It is especially its fictions which are designed for this purpose” (Berger 1961a: 96). 
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[into] bad faith…[and] to live in accordance with one’s dramatic assignment” (Berger 1961a: 
98).  
What all these instances of total identification with a role have in common is the 
avoidance of ecstasy. These individuals never confront the universe as men, 
nakedly, openly. They always hide in the costumes of the social carnival. They 
cannot face the world except as officers, priests, political devotees, insurance 
salesmen, or faculty wives. That is, they cannot face the world at all (ibid., 99).  
 
Berger, finally, applies this conceptualization of ‘bad faith’ to the church. The church and 
religion in general provide an individual ‘leap’ not into faith but into a religious ghetto (ibid., 
181). The ‘church’ is very much a place where someone hides and masks within a total meaning 
system, the ultimate moral alibi within an “okay world” of explaining ‘everything as alright.’ 
This social world is a “village” erected to provide the “illusion of sanctity, safety, sanity, and 
order” (ibid., 125).  
For in reality man does not live in an “okay world” at all. He rushes toward his 
own death on a course marked by indecipherable signs and surrounded on all 
sides by a darkness full of pain. He can become authentically human only if, in 
some way, he faces and comes to terms with this destiny (ibid., 121).  
 
The all-encompassing meaning system in the “okay world” prevents the very leap out of bad 
faith that would permit “ecstasy or conversion which will transport him outside the system, even 
if only for a moment of intellectual inspection” (ibid., 125). The web of meanings in religion 
makes possible a moral community that is quite possibly essential to social solidarity (ibid., 103), 
yet this is also characterized by alibis, bad faith, and precariously elaborated scaffoldings fitted 
for an “okay world.”23 
                                                
23 He states: “One does not have to be an existentialist to perceive that existence lurks with terrors. Thrown into the 
world in one brief moment of consciousness, we are surrounded on all sides by mystery which includes our own 
destiny and the meaning of a universe not too obviously constructed for our comfort. From the first reassuring smile 
of the mother bending over a frightened infant, society provides us with structures in which we can live with a 
measure of ease and which announce to us every day that things are in order. Busying ourselves at the warm, well-lit 
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Existential Freedom and the Warranted Critique of Christianity Informing Christian Humanism: 
Camus and Bonhöffer 
Many times religion is an “operation of bad faith from beginning to end” (Berger 1961a: 
125). “Religion is needed in society because men need bad faith. The paradigm of the social 
function of religion is the sword of the executioner at Freiburg” (ibid., 125). The anti-religious 
critique, for Berger, therefore contains a valid debunking consciousness. 
Berger (1959a) applauds the French atheist-existential philosopher Camus for his 
penetrating, valid critiques of Christianity yet also surprisingly as a means of also defending 
Christian truth. Camus’s radical positing of a world stripped of metaphysical meaning and his 
several valid insights into the problem of Christian theodicy retain validity against those whose 
faith finds in God the ultimate moral alibi. Camus criticizes the Christian faith because it allows 
someone to easily rationalize suffering, specifically “innocent suffering” (418).  “The Christian 
eschatology accepts injustice by pointing to eternity and to the suffering God on the 
cross…[which] make[s] men accessories to murder” (ibid., 418). Camus continuously draws on 
capital punishment themes where everyone affiliated with such an act are “accessories to 
murder” which Berger further extends by noting, “[t]here is an awful affinity between priest and 
hangman. That the symbol waved by Christian priests before countless victims of Christian 
torture is itself an instrument of execution may be grounds for reflection” (ibid., 418).24 
Second, Christianity as church sanctions disagreement with the status quo. It requires a 
“sacrifice to a political creed” (Berger 1959a: 418) where the Christian religious establishment 
                                                                                                                                                       
spots of the marketplace we can forget the howling visions of the night. Existence is leaning over a bottomless 
abyss. Society is the Potemkin village that shelters the abyss from our fearful eyes” (Berger 1961a: 97).  
 
24 It is noteworthy that The Precarious Vision (1961a) is similarly obsessed with the theme of capital punishment.  
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supports political rhetoric, approves war, and has messages preached behind pulpits for social 
issues, possibly even political sway in the voting booth.25  
Berger, apparently unconvinced of, or unwilling to fully embrace Camus’s atheistic 
existentialism, uses his negation of Christian bad faith and instead directs it against the 
institution of religion. In short, Berger (1961a) indicts the precarious scaffolding that religion 
affords the individual in contemporary society just as he earlier indicts the notion of society as 
alibi. The Christian religion in the modern world, or any religion for that matter, comprises 
persons comforting themselves in an “okay world,” wrapped in a moral alibi, and acting on the 
basis of a fictitious meaning system. Humans are still dealing with existence, death, and hope for 
life and the joys of life. This joy is ecstasy (ekstasis) and the first steps into freedom. For Berger, 
ecstasy as agency debunks society as a fiction, and a man as ‘das Man.’ The ‘precarious vision’ 
then in its fullest meaning is manifest as consciousness radically stripped of a metaphysically 
derived existence. Christianity devoid of its institutional comfort forces a confrontation with 
human moral autonomy.  
Camus’s final critique of Christianity centers on the concept of guilt. Jesus in the Gospels 
seems “melancholy” possibly due to the “guilt of God” (Berger: 1959a: 418). Moreover, “Jesus 
is guilty of the massacre of the innocents…the children of Bethlehem are dead, while he goes on 
living…the death of the Christian martyrs, and of all those martyred in turn by the new religion” 
(Ibid., 418). Considering that a “bystander” is guilty by allowing murder to occur, this implicates 
the idea of “God [as] the eternal bystander” (418).  Camus’s critique places on the table the 
fundamental question: Can a Christian be ethical and moral? Camus even questions whether or 
not a Christian could even exist as a decent human being.  
                                                
25 The Noise of Solemn Assembles (1961b) provides a much more elaborate discussion.  
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It is Dietrich Bonhöffer who provides for Berger (1959b) a Christian response to 
Camus’s anti-religious critique. Bonhöffer clarifies the terms of a new Christian ethic that can 
withstand these withering criticisms.26 At present, the church does not project an image of joy 
but of gloom, doom, and sorrow. These are leveraged so that the church emerges as a place of 
therapy and a safe-zone (an “okay world”) amidst the evil, modern world.  
Camus and Bonhöffer each furnish Berger elements of a ‘this-worldly’ approach, yet 
Camus inconsistently (unlike Bonhöffer) adheres to the notion of the ‘absurdity of human 
existence.’  
The absurd was for Camus a starting point, not by any means the culmination of 
his thought. Moreover, even during this period he sounded a strong affirmation of 
life, the simple life of this world and this world only…This affirmation is a 
continuing theme. Camus passionately defends the ultimate validity of 
joys…Friendship and conversation, an open sensuality without guilt, swimming 
in the sea, the touch of the evening’s cool breeze when the day’s work is done—
these are joys that all men can share, the joys of this life, the only real joys. 
Supernatural hopes are a betrayal of this common world of men and thus of 
humanity itself (1959a: 417).  
 
For Berger, God addresses man as a human of His creation, not as the societal alibis man 
has created for himself. When God addresses man, he addresses him as a particular, finite human 
being. When man participates and masks moral agency by belief in the fictions, he becomes even 
more radically disconnected from God.27 Christian humanism 
…means to ground all moral imperatives in men and not in institutionalized 
fictions. It means to see through the deceptions of social structure, through the 
                                                
 
26 Bonhöffer’s authenticity as a model contemporary Christian theologian significantly derives his involvement in a 
resistance movement against Hitler during WWII. He wrote several letters after his arrest by the Nazis and was 
executed in the Flossenbürg concentration camp on April 9, 1945.  
 
27 He states: “Bonhöffer would have us stop thinking of secularization as primarily a turning away from God. He 
would have us think of it as revealing God’s gift of freedom and of the world to man. Here we may use the Jewish 
concept known as tsimtsum or contraction: God created the world by contracting so that there was room for it. The 
act of creation was an act of renunciation on God’s part. We can understand secularization as part of God’s 
tsimtsum” (Berger 1959b: 451).   
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web of bad faith and rationalization. There is a very great liberation in acquiring 
such perception, though even this liberation pales compared with that which 
comes from God's eternal recognition of ourselves (Berger 1961a: 229).  
 
Berger’s Christian humanism, immensely important to Berger’s conception of agency in the 
modern world, thus aligned with a ‘this-worldly’ existence as displayed in the following figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Christian Humanism aligned with the Existentialist Anti-Religious Critique  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA:  THE NEW ETHIC AND THE 
FUNCTIONAL RELIGIONS 
This chapter explicates Berger’s critique of the American religious establishment. 
Underpinning his analysis is a conception of the agency-structure relation deriving from his 
previous research. It involves such major themes as the routinization of charisma, motif research, 
existentialism, and Christian humanism.  
The New Ethic and the Religious Establishment in America 
Economic and Social Forces 
Modern industrial growth in America is the principal causal context influencing the 
contemporary church and the individual believer, including especially its rapid societal, 
technological, and cultural consequences (Berger 1961b). American society in the early 1960s 
arose as a major force in world affairs, with Communism and developing ‘Third-World’ 
countries as emergent concerns. Other ‘revolutionary’ forces were also changing the American 
societal landscape. Medical advances, psychiatry, television, advertisements, and powerful 
marketing strategies, all were effectively re-shaping behavior on a mass scale. “[T]he impact of 
the new media of mass communications,” Berger asserts, “[is] functioning as immensely 
powerful molders of consensus throughout the society” (ibid., 40).   
The post-World War II era was characterized by problems of over-production, and a shift 
into a mass consumption-driven economy. Revolutionary economic forces were altering 
circumstances in fact, and in “consciousness” (Berger 1961b: 28). Technological advances, 
increasing goods, services, and standard of living; rising affluence, mobility, and freedom, all 
revolutionized the American scene. On the other hand, there are many unintended consequences 
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arising from “the ever more rapid transformation of our society, often in directions that we can 
but imperfectly foresee” (ibid., 24). This “economic revolution” can be a “vicious cycle, except 
that few [of its beneficiaries] would be disgruntled enough to call this relationship vicious” 
(ibid., 23).  
The Secular/Religious Continuum and the New Ethic 
Berger (1961b) focuses his analysis on the condition of American public and private life, 
noting in particular the “secular versus religious paradox.” This paradox drives, he asserts, the 
very behavioral “logic” of the individual. The religious sphere seems that it is radically separated 
from the secular. He defines secularization as follows: 
…the term refers to a segregation of religious motives within the [confines of the] 
religious institution itself. Within the broad areas of political, economic, and 
social life, religious motives appear to be of little relevance. The logic of policy 
and decision-making in these areas is overwhelmingly secular in character” (ibid., 
34; emphasis added).  
 
What is most noteworthy is a “paradox that the religious establishment (and, for that matter, the 
religious renaissance of recent decades) is to be found in a highly secularized society” (ibid., 34). 
This paradox is explained by Berger as rooted in the fact that religious life is both “irrelevant” 
and “functional”: it serves economic forces, consumption, and integration of conformist beliefs 
and values and is therefore “passive rather than active.” Religious life is “acted upon rather than 
acting” (ibid., 93). Two different logics compete and motivate the individual’s behavior within 
and without the church.  
The reality, of course, is that the person listening to the minister in church is a 
radically different one from the person who makes economic decisions the next 
day. When our typical church member leaves suburbia in the morning, he leaves 
behind him the person that played with the children, mowed the lawn, chatted 
with neighbors—and went to church. His actions now become dominated by a 
radically different logic—the logic of business, industry, politics, or whatever 
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other sector of public life the individual is related to. In this second life of his the 
church is totally absent (ibid., 37).  
 
In other words, acts that occur in routinized everyday secular life have come to define 
religious life and have crystallized into a religious establishment. Paradoxically then, Berger 
(1961b) examines the religious establishment, institutions, communities, and finally individual 
believers. His conclusion: religious groups and individuals are solemnly complacent participants 
in societal structures. These assemblies are no different than other secular institutions. Because a 
revolutionizing industrial and technological dynamism has great impact on each, secular and 
religious institutions have in effect become overly conformist and now control individual choice.  
Berger locates this collapse of genuine religiosity in the eclipse of the Protestant spirit. 
The Early American Protestants exhibited a ‘this-worldly’ ethic. Hard work and frugality were 
viewed as vehicles to propitiate the supernatural. Berger now observes a different ethos 
underwriting a shift from production to the consumerist “economy of abundance” (ibid., 28) that 
radically differs from the older ethic asserted in Max Weber’s famous analysis. “There can be 
little doubt” Berger asserts, “that American culture, despite all its Puritan vestiges, is veering 
away from such ‘asceticism.’ The ongoing of the advertising industry with the remnants of a 
thrift-oriented economic ethic gives us a vivid picture of this—and the conviction that advertisers 
are going to be successful!” (ibid, 28).  Cultural symbols once saturated in a supernatural aura 
have dissipated. God appears now only in times of extreme despair, danger or extreme crisis, 
thus calling into question a standard sociological definition of religion, as a persistent 
‘preoccupation with the supernatural’ (ibid., 42).28 
                                                
28 He states: “In the former case, [i.e. the classical Protestant ethic] the ethical emphasis was indeed this-
worldly…but this ethic was meaningful only against a background of intense preoccupation with supernatural 
realities. Today, the supernatural has receded into a remote hinterland of consciousness, mainly to break forth in 
moments of personal crisis, while the this-worldly ethic has remained with a vengeance. Indeed, if religion were to 
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In this new ethic, emphasis is placed on conscience, and emotional appeasement rather 
than supernatural appeasement. Emphasis on harmony and equilibrium are now expressed in 
community gatherings where American values compare analogously with Confucianism, a ‘way 
of the middle’ (Berger 1961b: 48-49).29 The harmonious ethic of equilibrium now suppresses 
metaphysical concerns with the sacred. A ‘common faith’ has generalized religion as morally 
and psychologically appeasing value-sets.30 Religion devolves into cultural concerns and is 
segregated as leisure activity. American culture shields and masks all signs of discord and 
suffering as children socialized in suburbia are comparable to a child who has been picked to be 
the new Buddha, to be protected from disclosure suffering, pain, or any forms of worldly 
discomforts (ibid., 48). This new ethic disseminates individuals into a structure lacking agency.  
American cultural values are integrated by the church and function to shelter adherents 
from the terrors of the world. Evil, suffering, pain, and encounters with the supernatural, are 
viewed as forms of pathology that must be quickly cured in order to bring an individual back into 
harmony. God is relegated to the farthest reaches of the universe, and the deepest pathological 
concerns of the mind. The new ethic also reflects consumerist affluence generalized in a 
common faith and community value system. Moral conduct no longer struggles with core 
                                                                                                                                                       
be identified with some sort of preoccupation with the supernatural, then what is said and done in most of our 
churches can hardly be given that name at all” (Berger 1961b: 42).  
 
29 He states: “For, if human existence could be said to have a day side and a night side, then American values 
strongly emphasize the former against the latter. In this respect, American culture has a rather striking resemblance 
to that of Confucianist China, where the metaphysical concerns were also suppressed in the sane, sensible conduct of 
one’s practical life…Such a cultural “way of the middle” (to use a Confucianist term) will attempt to avoid any 
experiences of ecstasy, that is, any experiences where men may step outside the routine of everyday life and 
confront the terrors of their condition…Death cannot be faced and therefore must be denied. But the denial of 
metaphysical concerns is not limited to the extreme fact of death. Our culture shields us effectively from all visible 
signs of suffering and degradation” (Berger 1961b: 48). 
 
30 Will Herberg coins the term “common faith” and Martin Marty similarly wields a notion of “religion-in-general” 
(Berger 1961a: 41). 
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metaphysical questions. In sum, the American religious establishment is viewed by Berger as an 
institutional expression of an over-arching post-WWII conformist American value system. This 
system prevents an individual from stepping outside of everyday-life routines; hard work and 
frugality have been replaced by competition, success, and secular activism. Business, churches, 
political, and educational institutions all contain these same conformist values. (Berger 1961b: 
43). 
The Functional Religions 
The functionality of the secular realm (e.g. economic, cultural, political, and social) 
perpetuates complacency in the religious realm. The most important function of religion 
therefore is to reproduce symbolic integration thereby facilitating social integration.31 Religion 
sustains and reproduces structural-institutional existence. It provides a conformity that explains 
“the cohesion of the American value system” and why that cohesion has “increased rather than 
decreased” in religious communities (Berger 1961b: 40).   
Second, there is an “intimate relationship between religion and the state” (Berger 1961b: 
58) in America despite protestations to the contrary. The nation was founded as a religiously 
inspired republic. Many, if not all political candidates must insert religious language—often- 
times to affirm their Christian bona fides. To appear as an atheist or agnostic (much less another 
faith altogether), or to use excessively secularist rhetoric would very much disrupt the “political 
marriage” (ibid., 60). This ‘common faith’ and political religion presumes adherence to those 
Judeo-Christian values that politicians never fail to mention. Political parties ceremonially begin 
                                                
31 Berger is indebted to Parsonian functionalism in this regard. See e.g. Talcott Parsons [1937]1949. The Structure of 
Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers. Illinois: The 
Free Press. Talcott Parsons 1951. The Social System. Illinois: The Free Press. Especially see e.g. Talcott Parsons 
1960. Structure and Process in Modern Societies. Illinois: The Free Press. 
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their conventions with prayers, moments of silence, and speeches rhetorically sprinkled with 
religious symbols. These moral fictions become social placeholders. 
A vast array of state-issued political incentives to religious groups is provided, such as 
tax-exempt status. Successful religious entrepreneurs amass significant capital in property and 
other investments. Non-profit organizations actively promote welfare and well-being in their 
surrounding communities, society, and the world at large and resemble purely secular groups that 
also focus on the needy. Military chaplains must honor and uphold secular rules, thereby 
securing pay and benefits from the government. Clergy may even receive state training if in the 
worst war-time scenarios they are called upon to provide emergency and spiritual assistance to 
the laity. Postage stamps, money and other state-issued materials quite often contain religious 
imagery. Educational institutions often socialize children using a healthy dose of ‘civil religion.’ 
Effectively, then, this political religion continuum may be interpreted as a form of social control 
(Berger 1961b). 
What Berger calls ‘social religion’ reinforces “status symbolism” thereby reaffirming 
political and cultural religions (Berger 1961b: 73). Churches are often segregated by both class 
and ethnicity thus mirroring social class structures. Class and race are divided in the churches 
characterizing this “cultural tone” and “faithfully mirror…class prejudices” (ibid., 89). Often 
racial prejudices creep into these meaning systems due to the preferences of the church laity 
themselves, for example, whether or not desegregation is warranted. In local church communities 
there exists homogeneity and class exclusion, and at the macro-level are definite divisions 
between middle-working and lower-classes thus mirroring social “class dynamics” (ibid., 82-83). 
Lower classes aspire to participate in a middle-class value system, and the middle-class, to 
perpetuate mainstream cultural and political values. Those who most often have “a stake in 
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society and the community” are also in a position to maintain the church status quo comprised of 
‘pillars within the community’ that already occupy high-level positions in secular life, and 
oftentimes they become clergy (ibid., 84-87). Sanctioning comes about when non-conforming 
deviants conflict with middle-class values of respectability and class homogeneity; other values 
include honorability, responsibility, respectability, success, and activism.  
At the center of this cultural perpetuation is the middle-class who furnish values 
upholding the status quo, including political beliefs, rhetoric, and other activities of socio-
political relevance. And of course the pulpit itself is not immune to such means of integration 
and social control. Ministers as members of a class-based value system avoid conflict. If the 
clergy observe no conflict and the laity appears happy and pleased it assumes the message must 
be correct. Theology and liturgical practices are constricted by social group conformity.  
Everyday individual religious life is easily comparable to business, office, and day-to-day 
life routines. Church life is office life with “a peculiar affinity with the business community” 
where lay leaders are “also successful in the economic world” (Berger 1961b: 85). Theological 
rhetoric must remain “popular with the laity,” and uphold the “common views” (ibid., 85); and, 
unpopular politics, morals, or messages that disrupt the integrated value system of the church are 
usually proscribed. Social religion functions as conformity, success values, political control, and 
a middling ethic of harmony and solemnity and prevents breaches. 
Finally, a type of ‘psychological religion’ is characterized by sheer promotion of ‘well-
being.’ Religious institutions are then viewed as a means to achieve individual psychological 
security and promote an overall symbolic integration (Berger 1961b: 93). Religious 
psychological models provide individuals with coping mechanisms for “minor and major crises” 
and are “conducive to mental health” (ibid., 96). An ‘O.K. world’ religion dispels these 
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“psychological anxieties” (ibid., 97) in a manner similar to the Freudian “psychotherapy 
movement” (ibid., 97). Clergy even are trained in psychology and counseling in order to provide 
therapeutic solutions confronting the laity. Because “the answer” is within the churches, 
individual believers are relieved of agentic powers; they have now become functionally 
integrated with those forces becoming ossified, general, and common. Christianity has become 
isomorphic with these societal forces and no longer a radical spiritual reflection rooted in moral 
autonomy. Religion as a structure in American society functions to avoid terrors and occasional 
mishaps and furthers a routine in which the individual adjusts to normative expectations, rules, 
and roles.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND SPECULATIVE REMARKS 
Peter L. Berger focuses his conception of agency upon the ‘inner’ transcendent meaning 
given to the religious object as such (spirit) by social actors. More importantly, it may be 
inferred that Berger conceives agency as the ability to move through time and history outside of 
routine, i.e. as unmediated spiritual encounter. Over time, his motif typologies predict the 
routinization process: the when and how of the group dynamics leading to formal patterning. His 
discussion of the World War II-era over-formalization and restriction of individual freedom 
echoes Max Weber’s broader rationalization thesis. For Berger, the “sect” represents an 
attempted exit from the mainstream social world, yet still its patterning eventually inhibits 
individual or group agency and its “fundamental motif” is tamed by structure and history. Time 
simultaneously restricts and reenergizes charisma and Berger’s extensive use of motif typologies 
permit discovery of potential charismatic points of departure for individual or group agents.  
The Problematic Account of ‘Social Structure’ in Berger 
Berger stresses that ecstasy makes agency possible. But if one must step outside of 
society and routine, how does one actually exit structure? Is it possible that Berger is more 
structuralist than he himself admits? Though known as the sociologist of consciousness and 
subjectivity, his scaffolding actually presumes a structure of some sort. Indeed it needs a ‘real’ 
society that then may be exposed as fictitious. His sociology in short may be structure-centered 
after all and more reliant on implicit patterns than he admits.  
Any empirical-sociological quest to discover unmediated and/or authentic ‘inner-
meaning’ presents problems however. Individuals either adhere to or distance themselves from 
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webs of meaning. Situations in the modern, pluralistic ideological-spiritual market place 
facilitate conversion or alternation. Berger’s explanations for the phenomena of conversion and 
alternation can only occur by presuming a determinate structure of relations, i.e. meaning 
systems.  
The Noise of Solemn Assemblies (1961b) is the culmination of Berger’s earliest 
conception of agency-structure relations. One detects all of the following: his reliance on Weber, 
routinization, charisma, motif research, and his conception of agency as an ecstatic stepping 
outside of routine. Yet his analysis confirms that at all times a structure of some sort constrains 
thus limiting the empirical agent. Macro-scale American society constrains this even further. For 
example, the integrative functions in culture, politics, and the social and psychological 
dimensions tend strongly towards equilibrium, and a ‘middle-way’ ethic reflect these larger 
structures. He describes structure as dampening opportunities for community that a truly ecstatic 
religious individual could experience as empowering individual interests or eccentricities. He 
does not however actually provide an account of an empirical social structure compatible with 
his spiritual assumption. 
For Berger, authenticity demands that individual existence triumph over generalizations, 
bad faith, and those fictional alibis upholding society. Berger’s quest to discover those empirical 
moments in society where individuals can step outside of the routine in all likelihood succumbs 
to his idealistic first principle, i.e. true existence can only be attained outside the existence of 
society as such. 
Is a Theological Sociology Possible? 
The question remains whether or not Berger’s theology and sociology are compatible. 
Berger advocates various strategies by which modern Christians can break free of structural 
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constraints, e.g. setting up open communities within these structures, or embracing a rebellious, 
modern, ‘this-worldy’ ethic. But can Berger logically maintain a sociological theology or 
theological sociology? His intentions are apparent: 
It is against this backdrop that we must understand the religious phenomenon in 
America. And, having attempted to understand it, it is against this same 
background that we must ask what the mission of the Christian Church ought to 
be in society (1961b: 30).  
 
Perhaps Berger is attempting to reconcile his personal theological convictions with his 
apparent high regard for the Enlightenment project. This project envisions a society that will 
‘free the man’ and remains the dream of liberal sociology. Berger reminds us of the “demand[] 
that sociologists lift their heads occasionally from their computer print-outs to address the larger 
issues that gave birth to the discipline” (Redfoot 1986: 118). Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel, 
Georg Simmel, and Max Weber, like Berger, appropriate strands of German thought and 
champion the freeing aspects of the Protestant conception of human moral freedom. Hegel calls 
this the Kantian religion and Weber traces its pedigree to Luther’s concept of the priesthood of 
the individual believer. The human sciences (Geisteswissenshaften) promote that spiritual energy 
inherent in every individual agent: a spirit that moves, propels, and tantalizes behavior to travel 
various indeterminate paths in life. The modern cosmopolitan setting comprises potentially a 
new context for these conditions to arise. It is noteworthy then that Berger to this day promotes 
the same plural, spiritual marketplace that he first describes in his dissertation. Berger is unafraid 
to defend his personal spiritual beliefs, and by so doing the reader remains in dialogue with a 
unique consciousness seeking to discover its own path to freedom and truth. It is laudable that he 
displays a very meticulous attachment to objectivity and frequently directs the reader to 
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recognize those moments when he owns his beliefs, speculations, or mere conjectures, and those 
when he decides to actually ‘put on his sociological cap’ so to speak.  
Berger’s radical epistemology means that no form of knowledge or data is off the table. 
This manner of addressing empirical phenomena (in his own Bergerian way) possibly remains 
true to the sociological discipline. His analysis of theological constructions, church behavior, and 
religion as an ‘insider’ is also consistent with an objective viewpoint. He views a true 
Christianity as one aligned with the liberal disciplines of the Enlightenment, and also with many 
aspects of existentialism. This is unproblematic as far as it goes, yet, to delve further is indeed to 
enter a realm of faith that betrays both logical and empirical proof.  
Concluding Speculative Remarks: Berger’s Battle with Eros 
Berger’s (1960) empirical-sociological quest is for a meaningful community within “the 
organizational complexity” of “church life”: one not reaching toward the heavens, or steeped in 
metaphysical or social alibis (22). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Swedish Lund School and 
Anders Nygren’s ([1932]1953) value-free observations provide Berger’s point of departure.  
Nygren asserts that Western religious history contains three fundamental motifs: Eros, Nomos, 
and Agape. These ideal motif typologies undergird all historical actions, behaviors, and beliefs. 
Eros is associated with a Hellenistic tradition that places God’s love external to and/or 
metaphysically beyond a worldly reality. Individual and group characteristics focus on self-love. 
Agape is that ‘true’ form of Christian love given directly by God and is only accessible under 
conditions of faithful freedom. Nomos is that security of feeling under law commonly associated 
with Judaism. According to Nygren’s theology the relative prevalence of these motifs provides 
clues as to how God’s presence is understood within communities and civilizations. Agape, for 
Berger, is given by God in that moment when an individual is truly freed to accept it. He claims 
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in the modern age the search for Agape is then the sociological search for communal church 
conditions that enable this individual freedom to be expressed (Berger 1960). 
Changes in the relative force exerted by a motif correlates with changes in religious 
groups, churches, and civilizations. Agape and Eros compete as opposing motifs. Berger uses 
Ferdinand Tönnies’ typology of  Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to further analyze the 
consequences over time of this motif conflict between Agape and Eros.  A quest for 
Gemeinschaft or traditional communal life arises in the midst of Gesellschaft, i.e. urban 
individuated life. The latter is often impersonal and bureaucratic, and facilitates behaviors 
associated with city life. Another way of defining the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction is to 
contrast a rural family unit with that of business or office life.  
As a result of the rapid technological growth stemming from the industrial revolution 
“our civilization has been subject to an ever-more rapid and thorough” (Berger 1960: 14) 
increase in associations, human relations, or sociation (Vergesellschaftung). The sociological 
empirical trend is explained as “an age that forces people to live most of their lives in large, 
impersonal, bureaucratic structures” where there is a new retreat into suburbia in response to 
these forces. The common conception of the Christian church then becomes one of a community 
escaping the evils of the modern urban world. A retreat to suburban life is accompanied however 
with the ‘guilt’ of not having “neighborly relations” in urban settings (Berger 1960: 16). At the 
same time, Christian urban communities manifest guilt and an uneasiness toward their modern 
neighbors that for Berger “completely distorts the real question as to what Christian community 
ought to be in [a truly] modern society” (ibid., 16). Regardless of what the conditions of 
Christian community should be and what types of freedom are possible in modern society, 
Berger definitely indicates where he believes a worthwhile agency is not to be found.  
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Whatever answer we may come up with, Christian community is certainly not the 
establishment of agrarian enclaves within urban culture. There is no reason, other 
than that of personal taste, why Christians cannot welcome the possibilities of 
highly individuated community that modern society has to offer (ibid, 16).  
 
Hence, Berger’s conundrum: bureaucratic organization will not allow freedom, and neither can a 
pretended rural enclave; Berger must therefore identify a structure that permits the agency he 
believes can be found within the ‘community’ form of church (though within a modern, 
metropolitan setting).  
Berger’s definition of community considerably differs from typical sociological 
conceptions and possibly betrays his fundamental theological standpoint. Communities are for 
him the “social forms in which agape can express itself…the ruralistic image of community, 
insofar as it understands itself as Christian can be theologically criticized as confusing eros and 
agape” (1960: 17). Rather than a product of mere theological speculation, though, Berger claims 
that he can sociologically describe human relations and examine whether or not these group 
movements can formulate the conditions necessary for the temporal manifestation of Agape. He 
does this with what he calls Max Weber’s “law” of the ‘routinization of charisma’ (ibid., 17).  
Berger claims that sociological, empirical, and historical evidence confirms the fact that 
whereas the church underpins Eros, the sect facilitates Agape. “The ideal-typical situation in 
terms of the sociology of religion is the transition from sect to church…The close community of 
believers, sociologically visible in the nascent stage of the movement, now becomes dissipated in 
the large structures of ecclesiastical organizations” (ibid., 17). Historical verification of this 
routinization effect appears “again and again in church history” and “can be partially interpreted 
as the effort to re-discover social forms in which agape could be empirically expressed” (ibid., 
17).  Berger, following Anders Nygren’s definition of community, views agape as one type of 
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community where “each member bases his actions solely on what he considers the others’ needs 
to be…[and] a community totally open to all who wish to enter…[and choosing] all our friends 
exclusively by the criterion of who needs us most” (ibid., 17-18). This community would “spell 
the end of society and sociability as we know it” (ibid., 18) possibly due to its empirical 
impossibility and definitely resulting of Berger’s awareness of an integrated social order. The 
contemporary family and American rural retreat is the opposite of this type of community, 
however, and therefore agape is “empirically unavailable” due to these rural forms of behavior 
he claims are present in middle-class Protestants. Overarching societal functions further reinforce 
the Protestant trend to maintain rural and therefore closed communities disconnected from 
modern society. Figure 4 displays Berger’s conception of agency. 
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Nygren’s terms may appear “strange indeed to a sociologist’s eye,” but church history 
and the concept of routinization create those pressures that inspire sectarian movements to arise 
in the church in quest of agape (ibid, 20). It is evident that when Berger’s own value-free 
assessments end, and his ethical and moral values begin, he is looking for the community, similar 
to Barth and Bonhöffer’s, that is secularized, has come of age in the modern world and one that 
simultaneously allows individuation and Agape. Given structures that tend toward Eros, Berger 
searches for alternative structures of community permitting ecstasy. A social agent in this regard 
can only be conceived in Berger’s theory as a spiritual one. It is noteworthy that Berger sees in 
theological motifs another empirical artifact in his sociological quest for truth, yet also an 
element of faith where one must simply concede ‘these are hinterlands where one cannot go.’  
Berger’s failure to identify the conditions for concrete empirical agency are rooted most 
directly, though, in these ‘hinterlands.’ Agape presumes an unmediated spiritual encounter free 
by definition of any actual historically created product made by and for actual humans as social 
beings. Genuine agency must therefore be located outside the historical capacities of actual 
agents. Agape is not something actually even accomplished in its basic formulation. Agape is 
rooted in a transcendent God-full and God-given moment. It is not a love attainable socially at 
all, but only by those whose faith has permitted an actual exit from the societal routine so as to 
directly encounter God’s grace as gift. 
The fatal irony in Berger’s position is this: genuine agency in history is only finally 
attainable by exiting history. It is faith in the idea that true human freedom is a gift not of human 
action, but of its surrender. Berger’s deepest theological convictions have led him to posit a 
notion of agency that is both non-empirical, and non-attainable. An article of faith—or rather 
deduction from faith—“society” is Berger’s story about a fictional story—about “society” and 
50 
 
“social order”—whose real truth is merely bad faith and its consequences. In the end, Berger’s 
story is of a theologian whose sociology stopped short of the very history—empirical, material, 
social—it had sought to explain.  
It is also in that spirit that Berger’s appropriation of the sociological tradition was 
conducted. Berger sought alliances with the radical contingency of sociological fact he identified 
in various schools of social psychology. The notion of the fictional society and its precariousness 
required a sociology of this sort. In its most radical expressions it provides for Berger what is in 
effect a merely contingent array of actors whose convictions, should they change, would 
radically rupture the very fabric of the social order. This is truly the existentialistic society, or 
what he would soon coin as a ‘humanistic sociology’ (Berger: 1963b).  
But this existentializing of social order even applied to traditions positing a notion of 
society strictly rooted in definite functional and institutional requisites. On close inspection 
though even the solidity of structural functionalism evaporates in Berger’s account to become 
nothing but the will to power of a non-truly Christian church and its post-war accommodation 
with the forces of technological and cultural modernity.  
In the end it is truly irrelevant whether a radically contingent or apparently structuralist 
sociology is engaged. Berger’s appropriation of their insights is merely to display the various 
flavors society and its theorists and describers have conjured as a means of avoiding the world 
that truly exists; its ultimate Creator; and one’s own indescribable mysterious relation to the 
Divine outside history.  
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